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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FLOYD WEBSTER, .] 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ] 
vs. 
MARY LEHMER AND CHARLES LEHMER, ] 
Defendant-Appellants. ] 
Appeal No. 19339 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/Respondent Floyd Webster seeks rescission of a 
contract for the sale of his home and lot in Deer Valley and 
Defendants/Appellants Mary and Charles Lehmer, in a counterclaim, 
pray for specific performance of the contract. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN LOWER COURT 
Webster commenced this action in the District Court for Summit 
County, Utah, on July 14, 1981, seeking rescission of the sale of 
his home and lot in Deer Valley. Lehmers answered the complaint 
and counterclaimed, seeking specific performance of the agreement. 
At the conclusion of the trial to the court, conducted on 
January 18th through 20, 1983, the court announced its ruling in 
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favor of Webster. (T. 414-419).~/ The district court entered 
judgment (R. 367-369) and the ultimate findings of fact and 
conclusions of law were filed on June 29, 1983. (R. 493). The 
district court's judgment granted Websterfs requested relief of 
rescission of the real estate agreement. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Lehmers seek reversal of the district court's order of 
rescission of the real estate contract and for an order of specific 
performance in favor of Lehmers or, alternatively, a new trial. 
Webster asks that the judgment be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Since this is a case in equity it is the sum of the 
circumstances that is important. Appellants in their opening 
brief use fourteen pages to cover their statement of facts. 
Because it is the sum that is important, plaintiff will first point 
out the statements of the defendants that appear to be inaccurate 
or misleading and second set forth plaintiff's own statement of 
facts so that the entire matter can be seen in proper perspective. 
1. Facts or Implications Set Forth In Appellant's Brief 
To Be Controverted In Whole or In Part. 
References are to the Trial Transcript ("T"), the designated 
record from the District Court file ("R"). 
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Paragraph 5 of the opening brief makes the statement that, 
"In 1948 and continuing thereafter, the underlying fee simple 
interest and ownership of the subject property were held in 
independent ownership." We would acknowledge that record title to 
the underlying fee simple interest was in the mining company and 
its successors in interest but allege that there was a genuine 
issue as to right of possession and therefore ownership. Defendants 
acknowledged the distinction and recognized that Webster was the 
de facto owner of the property. (T. 309:4-14). On pages 6 and 15 
of plaintiff's opening brief, they speak of the "sophisticated" 
mining machinery and allege "In conjunction with this mechanical 
work, Webster used and understood technical manuals and printed 
materials concerning the machinery and vehicles on which he worked" 
and that "he readily understood complex mechanical manuals and he 
read the daily newspaper." These conclusions from the testimony 
are clearly non-sequitur or at least gross distortions calculated 
to mislead and are contrary to what was conspicuous to the trial 
judge. See Finding #5 and Conclusion #1. The statement on page 6 
that "Webster had never relied upon the Lehmers for business advice 
or the conduct of his day-to-day affairs and Webster was capable of 
making his own independent decisions" is not completely accurate 
and conflicts with the evidence. See plaintiff!s statement of facts 
and supporting references that follow. The statement at the bottom 
of page 7 that the contract "was read and understood by Webster and 
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the Lehmers" is too absolute as will be hereinafter pointed out. 
On page 8 of the opening brief, there is the allegation that "In 
late October 19 80, Webster decided to move from the subject property 
and live with his former neighbor, Mary Dudley, in Heber City, Utah. 
Webster advised Lehmers of that intention and by the end of November 
1980 Webster had voluntarily removed himself from the subject 
property." This statement must be modified by the fact that Mr. 
Webster continued to sleep in the home from time to time during 
October, November and December. (T. 182-183). Again on page 10 
there is a need to draw a distinction between title being in the 
name of and owned by Royal Street Land Company vis-a-vis the 
"record title" being reflected in said name. Page 11 of their brief 
claims, "The policy (50* a square foot) was not only undeclared and 
unpublished, it was not generally disseminated in the Park City 
area. The testimony is absolutely clear that Lehmers were not 
aware of any informal or ad hoc policy of Royal Street between 
October and December 1980." Both defendant Mary Lehmer and her 
witness Neil Clegg stated the contrary. See Neil Clegg1s testimony 
(T. 334-335) and Lehmer's testimony (T. 269). On page 11 it is 
alleged that "On the other hand, Webster had been told by a 
neighbor, Neil Clegg, prior to October 1980, that Royal Street 
might have an informal policy in which the underlying fee title 
could be acquired and that Webster should check with Royal Street 
A 
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to determine whether that policy would apply to his squatter's 
interests." The existence of said "conversation" is denied by 
Mr. Webster. (T. 146-147). Appellants statement of facts and 
conclusions and references on pages 12 and 13 of their opening brief 
need to be scrutinized. For example, the question to Mr. Webster 
was, 
Q. Now, with regard to whether the ground surrounding 
your property was owned by the BLM or by Royal Street, 
it didn't make any difference to you, did it, at the 
time you sold the property to Mrs. Lehmer? 
A. No, it didn't. (T. 147-148) 
Mr. Campbell, thinking one thing but saying something else, asked 
concerning the property "surrounding" the Floyd Webster parcel. 
He did not inquire as to whether it made any difference as to who 
was the "record title" holder of the property upon which Mr. 
Webster's home was located, that is, the property that was subject 
to Floyd Webster's easement, his adverse possession claim, his 
squatter's interest. Of course it made no difference who owned the 
surrounding property. But what about the subject property? That's 
the important question. Further, what was Mr. Webster's 
understanding of the term "underlying property?" Did this term 
connote, to the old miner, the mineral or subsurface rights? The 
word "underlying" by dictionary definition means "lying beneath." 
Surface vis-a-vis subsurface or mineral interests; record title 
holder vis-a-vis de facto owner or adverse possession owner; Floyd 
Webster's home and lot vis-a-vis the surrounding property; what are 
we talking about, what was contemplated by the witness? How much 
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did Mr. Webster comprehend? How much distortion resulted from the 
suggestive form of the question? In fairness to the witness there 
needed to be a distinction drawn between record title and the right 
to possession, that is, ownership rights established by way of 
easement and/or adverse possession. Floyd Webster did make it clear 
that he would not have sold if he had known he was on mining company 
property. (T. 133, 175). The record is replete with examples of 
this witness giving simple but completely accurate responses to a 
question, which answers, on first impression, appeared to counsel 
to be either inaccurate or inconsistent. Page 14 alleges that Floyd 
Webster "was not under any disability" but that "Webster claimed at 
trial that he was a drunk, an alcoholic, and that he was depressed 
because of the death of his wife." It was primarily his friends 
and associates that were aware of this condition, not Mr. Webster 
(T. 205-206, 208), although he himself recognized that he was 
destitute and depressed. (T. 194-195). The allegation that 
"Lehmers were not aware of any claimed alcoholic problem of Webster" 
is contrary to the circumstantial evidence and there is an 
interesting, if not amusing acknowledgement, by Mary Lehmer 
to the reality of this "problem." On page 251 of the transcript 
Mrs. Lehmer was asked "You knew on October 7, 19 80, that Floyd 
Webster had a drinking problem; did you not?" Answer. "No. 
"I've known of no drinking problem he has. He just likes to drink." 
The statement on page 14 that, "There is no testimony that in 
6 
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October 19 80 Webster was incapable of handling or administering 
his affairs," is in dispute. The real issue was the extent of his 
capability. In our statement of facts we reflect those matters 
that shed light on the matter. A statement on page 16 of the 
transcript reads: "At the date of the transaction, the Lehmers 
believed that the fair market value of Webster's squatter1s rights 
was not more than $5000.00." Our riposte: Mary Lehmer was an 
astute attorney, a sizeable landholder in Park Cityf she served on 
the committee that formulated Summit County's zoning ordinance and 
on the Park City Master Plan Committee/ she was city attorney from 
1968-70 and a council member from 1972-76/ she was well aware of the 
50C a square foot policy and knowledgeable concerning possessory 
rights of the squatters, including Floyd Webster's, which squatters 
she had competently advised about their right to permanently remain 
on the land, and she had just three months before negotiated for and 
acquired record title to her 26,000 square feet of property in Deer 
Valley for ?2,000.00 from Royal Street Land Company and she knew 
that Floyd Webster and many of her neighbors with houses on Royal 
Street Land Company land - mining company land - were in a similar 
position to so purchase. (T. 39-46/ 309:4-14). Circumstantial 
evidence was so clear and convincing to the contrary that in substance 
the trial court found her purported statement of belief to 
have been impeached. On page 16 we find the following statement: 
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"The only testimony offered at trial as to the fair market value 
of the squatter's rights sold by Webster to Lehmers on October 7, 
1980, as amended on December 20, 1980, was that of Lehmers, viz,, 
between $1500.00 to $5000.00." These statements are controverted 
as now hereinafter set out. 
2. Plaintiff's Statement Of The Facts. 
While in a state of extreme poverty and somewhat depressed, 
without heat or water in his small home (T. 106; 115:11-116:23; 
194:18-195:13; 205:23-206; 208:18-24 Exhibit 17), Floyd Webster, 
a 61 year old unemployed miner with 25 years underground (T. 103:10-18) 
and an eighth grade education (T. 94:16-21), is called in off the 
street on October 7, 1980, while passing the home of his neighbors 
and friends, Ray and Mary Lehmer. (T. 101:10-102; 115:4-10; 167; 
257:25-258:21). They lived next door to each other in Deer Valley. 
Mary Lehmer, successor to a "squatter," an attorney, former Park 
City Attorney and member of the City Council (T. 222:2-5; 405:9-10) 
acquired the record title to 26,000 square feet of property in Deer 
Valley just three months before for $2,000.00 from Royal Street 
Land Company (T. 41-45) and she knew that Floyd Webster and many 
of her neighbors with houses on Royal Street Land Company land— 
mining company land—had a "title problem" about which she had been 
active in counseling them. The problem results from living in a 
house on mining company land, a situation which she had in common 
with Floyd Webster and other neighbors and had extensively 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
researched. (T. 236-250). She and her husband had previously 
discussed Floyd Webster and his property and called him in from 
the porch as he passed by on the street, all part of a 
preconceived plan (T. 101, 102, 115, 257, 258) to acquire 
$240,000.00-$400,000.00 worth of property from a friend and 
neighbor for a sum slightly in excess of $5,000.00. 
Mary Lehmer had counseled Floyd Webster as an attorney after 
his wife's, Alice's, death in 1975 and had also advised Alice. 
(T. 108:19-109 134:1-7; 223:5-6; 236:18-21; 245:21-246:17; 281:11-14). 
Floyd Webster had met with her and her husband many times and done 
work for them without charge. (T. 106:20 to 108:5; 110 to 112). 
Floyd Webster "trusted" Mrs. Lehmer and her husband and "figured 
that she was a square-shooter" "her being an attorney." 
(T. 123:3-20; 193:7-10). During October and December of 1980 
Floyd Webster had a drinking problem (T. 106:13-19; 134:15-20; 
206-208) undoubtedly known to the Lehmers (T. 251:34) and they also 
knew he needed money. It was at a time when nothing seemed to "make 
any difference" (T. 147:20 to 150). But still it appears that he 
"would not have sold (his home and land) for $5,000.00" if he "had 
known that (his home) was on mining property." (T. 133, 169:8-9). 
When he came into the house Mary and Ray Lehmer immediately 
offered Floyd Webster $5,000.00 for his house and interest in the 
property except for the right to live there for life and she promptly 
drew up an agreement in her handwriting which he and the Lehmers 
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signed. (T. 167 and Exhibit 11). Floyd Webster believed he had 
certain vested rights in the surface (T. 166:17-23, 178) possibly 
because of the advice that attorney Mary Lehmer had given to him. 
(T. 246:4-9). Floyd knew when he signed this agreement that Royal 
Street had a policy of selling title for 50£ a foot to persons who 
had their homes on mining company land (T. 120:9-25; 163, 48:9-10, 
60:19-2 0) and he also knew that property smaller than his had been 
sold for much more than $5,000.00. In fact, a smaller parcel than 
his sold for $190,000.00 between November 1980 and January of 
1981. (T. 6-10, Exhibits 1-4). It was Floyd Webster's belief when 
he signed this agreement that the land under the subject house was 
owned by the Bureau of Land Management and not the mining company 
(T. 117-120; 149; 169; 217) and he thought that Ray and Mary Lehmer 
believed this too because he knew they were knowledgeable about the 
property situation in Deer Valley and he trusted that they would 
tell him if they knew otherwise. (T. 123). He recognized an 
economic difference created in part because of the 50<? policy. 
(T. 175:21-25). And he would not have sold had he been aware that 
it was on mining property (property owned by Royal Street Land 
Company). (T. 133:14-21). 
As the agreement of 10/7/80 didn't provide any time for the 
payment to Floyd Webster and he needed money, he went back to the 
Lehmer residence three times in October and November of 1980 to 
obtain advances totaling $700.00. (T. 125-126; 179-182). When he 
10 
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went again to their residence on 12/21/80 to secure an advance 
of $100.00 or $200.00 for Christmas, Mary Lehmer wrote up another 
agreement in his presence and he signed it. (T. 131:23 to 133; 224). 
This agreement provided that he would surrender his life estate in 
the property in exchange for payments by the Lehmers of (1) the 
"unpaid water, sewer, and scavenger charges of $356.20 needed to 
reinstall meter and connect water to my house," (2) "the 1980 
taxes due and unpaid on my house," and (3) "the legal expenses 
and recording fees to terminate my dead wife's joint tenancy in my 
home." (Exhibit 12). Attorney Lehmer understood the significance 
of joint tenancy property. (T. 226:4-227:1; 230:16-22). She was 
knowledgeable concerning the laws of intestate succession and knew 
that if the property was not in joint tenancy, that Floyd Webster's 
two daughters were entitled to two-thirds of their mother's 
one-half interest. (T. 233-235). It was the intention of Mary 
Lehmer that this agreement written on the back of that of 10/7/80 
would integrate and merge both agreements into the latter. 
Attorney Lehmer did not read or explain the agreements to Floyd 
Webster but left it up to him to read and comprehend. He was unable 
to adequately do so. (T. 130 to 131; 171:5-6). Three days later 
on December 24, 19 80, the Lehmers rented the house for $250.00 a 
month. (T. 274:22-25). They did not pay the 1980 taxes, Arlene 
Nyman did so. (Exhibit 5). In January of 1981 Floyd Webster 
refused to execute a deed to the Lehmers or take any more money 
from them and on February 24th and 27th, 19 81, his attorney offered 
11 
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to return to the Lehmers the full amount of their advances and 
expenditures. (Exhibits 23 and 24). 
3. District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Floyd Webster, the plaintiff at the time of the transactions 
involved, October 7, 1980, and December 21, 1980, was a sixty-one 
year old miner of some thirty-three years of experience, twenty-five 
of which were underground, with an eighth grade formal education. 
Mary Lehmer, the remaining defendant, was a retired lawyer who 
practiced many years with considerable experience in real estate 
matters. 
2. The plaintiff and the defendant were neighbors for several 
years and befriended one another. The plaintiff trusted the 
defendant and felt he could rely upon her advice which she gave 
him and his wife without charge from time to time over the years. 
The plaintiff placed confidence in the defendant to the extent that 
he felt that the confidence would not be abused and that defendant 
would not act contrary to his interest. 
3. That plaintiff after the death of his wife in 19 75 and 
through the time of the transactions became despondent and depressed 
to the extent that his personal affairs suffered; specifically, he 
suffered from a severe drinking problem. He lost his driving 
privileges prior to and had no drivers license at the time of the 
transactions involved here as a result of an arrest on a D.U.I, 
charge. 
12 
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4. His water and gas had been shut off in approximately 
August of 1980. In October of 1980 he was unemployed. He was 
in need of money. His family was assisting him by providing 
food and money. His property taxes had not been paid for a period 
of four years and were delinquent for three years. 
5. The plaintiff purchased the property in question, which 
became the family residence for approximately thirty-three years, 
with his wife as a tenant in common. The plaintiff has an obvious 
lack of mental capacity or training to independently understand 
the effect of the transaction involved. This was graphically 
illustrated by his attempt to read the contract, Exhibit D-ll, 
during the testimony. 
6. The defendant initiated the October 7, 1980, contact with 
the proposal and immediately thereupon wrote the contract. 
Plaintiff had no independent advice. The same occurred on December 
21, 1980. The defendant had acquired the fee title to her own 
land which consisted of approximately 35,355 square feet within 
some six months or thereabouts prior to the transactions here in 
question from Royal Street Land Development Company, the mining 
company, for $2,000.00. The land which is the subject of this 
suit is a considerably smaller parcel. 
7. The defendant knew the plaintiff's home was not on Bureau 
of Land Management (BLM) property as early as 1978 or 1979. 
Indeed, the defendant knew, having researched the matter, that 
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the so-called "squatters" had apparent adverse possessory rights 
against the mining company as early as 1972. The defendant knew 
that the plaintiff was a "squatter" and that the mining company 
had a policy of selling fee title to squatters for 50* a square 
foot well prior to October 7, 1980. 
8. The plaintiff believed on October 7, 1980, and continued 
to believe until February the 18th of 19 81 that his property was 
owned by BLM; yet, significantly, no discussion regarding fee 
ownership ensued during the contract negotiations. There existed 
grossly disparate sophistication regarding financial and real 
estate matters to the extent that the transaction was not considered 
by the court to be at arms length. 
9. Both parties believed the property was held in joint 
tenancy when, in fact, it was held as tenants in common with an 
interest in the plaintiff's daughters since his wife had died 
intestate. The property had a potential fair market value at the 
time of the transactions to the plaintiff and his daughters of 
$240,000.00 to $400,000.00, which was contracted away for the sum 
of $5,000.00 plus the payment of miscellaneous items totaling 
$409.20. 
10. The plaintiff would not have sold for that amount had he 
known the property was not on BLM property. The mining company 
would have sold him fee title for 50C a square foot. The court 
cannot see that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence let alone 
gross negligence in not being aware of fee ownership and so finds. 
14 
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The court cannot say either that this unawareness was the result 
of inexcusable lack of due care and so finds, 
11. The transaction of December 21, 1980, involved a 
possessory interest created by that of October 7, 1980. Three 
days later, on December 24, 1980, defendant rented the dwelling 
on the subject property for $250.00 a month and it has been 
continuously rented at or above that amount since that time. 
There were no legal expenses in connection with the severance of 
the non-existent joint tenancy. Defendant intended the two 
transactions to be integrated in one contract. 
12. Defendant will not be seriously prejudiced by rescission 
except to lose the benefits of the unconscionable contract. It 
is possible to now restore defendant to the status quo - there 
being no evidence that defendant changed her position after the 
execution of the October 7, 19 80, and December 21, 19 80, writings. 
13. The proof that established the existence of the foregoing 
facts was clear and convincing. 
From the foregoing facts, the court concludes: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There existed grossly disparate sophistication regarding 
financial and real estate matters to the extent that the transaction 
was not considered by the court to be at arms length. 
2. The plaintiff was not guilty of negligence, let alone 
gross negligence, in not being aware of fee ownership nor was this 
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unawareness the result of inexcusable lack of due care. 
3. Defendant will not be seriously prejudiced by rescission 
and it is possible to now restore her to the status quo. 
4. There existed a unilateral mistaKe of fact on the part of 
the plaintiff regarding ownership of the property sufficient to 
warrant rescission; indeed the consequences of which were so grave 
that to enforce this contract would be unconscionable. This 
unilateral mistake of fact specifically related to a material 
feature of the contract, that is the purchase pricef in accordance 
with the doctrine set forth in the case of Ashworth v. Charlesworth, 
119 UT 650 (1951), and the plaintiff under the circumstances did 
not act negligently. 
5. There existed a confidential relationship which has been 
adopted by the Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Blodgett v. 
Martsch, Utah, 590 P.2d 298 (1978), between the parties founded 
upon trust and friendship developed over a period of years, which 
trust and confidence were abused sufficient to warrant rescission. 
If a party in whom another reposes confidence misuses that 
confidence to gain his own advantage while the other has been made 
to feel that the party in question will not act against his welfare, 
the transaction is the result of undue influence in accordance 
with 13 Williston on Contracts, Section 1625. 
6. There existed a mutual mistake of fact sufficient under 
the circumstances to warrant rescission. The title was held in 
16 
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tenancy in common pursuant to Statute 57-1-5 of the Utah Code 
Annotated. Both parties believed the property was held in joint 
tenancy. As concerning the mutual mistake as to ownership of the 
property, such, a unique set of circumstances were present that 
the principle of mutuality of right should apply, that is, the 
rights of the plaintiff and the defendants should be reciprocal. 
7. The two transactions are integrated, but if they were not 
they should each be separately rescinded. 
8. The foregoing findings of fact and these conclusions of 
law were established and are supported by clear and convincing 
evidence. (R. 493-499). 
4. Comment on Appellant's Reference To Matters 
Not In Evidence. (See footnote 2, page 5 of 
Appellant's Brief and various references to 
depositions in Statement of Facts, etc.). 
All depositions were published, but the court did not consider 
the depositions in toto as having been offered and received as 
evidence. Portions did become part of the evidence as used at 
time of trial during cross examination pursuant to Rule 32(a)(1) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The depositions were neither 
formally offered nor admitted during the trial - they were not 
received in toto pursuant to Rule 32(a)(2). The court drew a 
distinction between (a) a deposition being published and then used 
for a specific purpose formally proposed by counsel during the 
trial, and (b) a deposition being formally offered and admitted 
17 
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at trial to be considered in its entirety. In the latter case, 
opposing counsel is put on notice and has an opportunity to 
respond and rebut. This matter was presented to the trial court 
and ruled upon. (R. 373-374; 392; 489-490; 493). We believe 
that the depositions in toto as well as other matters not received 
in evidence strengthen and support plaintiffs position, but 
consider it improper to insert the same within the brief inasmuch 
as they are not part of the evidence offered and received. 
Defendants effort to use non-evidentiary matters is improper. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY 
WAS MATERIAL AND PROPERLY ADMITTED 
The total consideration Lehmers paid for the property was 
slightly in excess of $5,000.00. The fair market value was 
between $240,000.00 to $400,000.00. It is self evident why 
defendants adamantly resisted and still resist any evidence that 
would reveal this gross desparity, for Lehmers had contracted to 
pay only 1%% to 2%% of the fair market value. 
Ultimate Issue In Condemnation Cases Vis-a-vis An Equity Case. 
We are dealing with a case in equity. "Equity considers factors 
which may be irrelevant in actions at law, such as the unfairness 
of a party's conduct. . . the hardship in granting or denying 
relief. Although an equity court no longer has complete 
18 
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discretion in granting or denying relief, it may exercise wide 
judicial discretion in weighing the factors of fairness, . . , and 
this court on appeal will reverse the trial court only where an 
abuse, of this discretion is clearly shown." Warren v. Dixen 
Ranch Company, 123 Utah 416, 419. 
The cases cited by defendant accurately set out the general 
principles of law that apply in an ordinary condemnation case 
where the ultimate issue of fact is "fair market value" or the 
cash amount that must be paid for the property taken. An eminent 
domain proceedings is an action in law and not in equity. The 
ultimate issue is just compensation. 
If, as the Warren case holds, "an equity court* . . may exercise 
wide judicial discretion in weighing the factors. . ." and may 
consider "factors which may be irrelevant in actions at law," then 
the following facts should be considered and weighed and the 
conclusions that are self evident should not be ignored. Here 
are the facts: 
(a) The property was appraised to have a value of 
$240,000.00 by Pia. (T. 69). 
(b) Brown, Lehmers' appraiser, acknowledged that 
property was worth $300,000.00 to $400,000.-00. (T. 380). 
(c) Floyd Webster and his wife had resided on and 
possessed the property for more than 35 years having purchased 
it from his wife's mother in 1948. (T. 95, 102, Exhibit 10). 
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(d) Royal Street Land Company had a policy of selling 
the property to squatters for 50C a square foot, which policy was 
well known and was in existence on October 7, 1980, and on 
December 21, 1980, and had been in effect for several years. 
(T. 18, 22, 39, 40-43, 56). 
(e) Royal Street would have sold any interest or claim 
it had in the property to Floyd Webster for the price of 50C a 
square foot. (T. 48, 60) . 
(f) Lehmers knew of the policy. (T. 41-45; 269-287). 
(g) Lehmers believed and had advised others that it 
was not even necessary to pay the 50£ a square foot. (T. 309). 
(h) Lehmers purchased the property for approximately 
$5,000.00 - about 2% of its fair market value. 
If a court of equity can weigh the factors, it may also 
consider the sum of the factors. The disparity between the 
$5,000.00 contract price and the $240,000.00 to $400,000.00 fair 
market value is so clear that we might refer to this as a res ipsa 
loquitur situation. 
"Equity looks to the substance and not to the shadow, to the 
spirit and not the letter. . . . It seeks justice rather than 
technicality, truth rather than evasion, common sense rather than 
quibbling." State v. Tyler County State Bank, 282 SW 211, 45 ALR 
1483, 1484. "Equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy. It 
is elastic in that it looks to the substance rather than the form, 
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and will never be applied to reach an inequitable result, or 
permit itself to be frozen into a position of applying mechanical 
rules so that it becomes crystallized." Cannon v. Bingham, 383 
SW 2d 169, 174. 
The lower court did not error by denying Lehmersr Motion 
In Limine. It had a right/ if not an absolute duty, to apply its 
X-rays to all masks and covers and see through to the real substance 
and to find the answer to the question, "What was the property 
really worth?" 
The inadequacy of consideration is not only relevant to the 
issues of undue influence and mistake of fact, it constitutes a 
ground for rescission of and by itself in an instance such as 
the present one. In discussing the various exceptions to the 
general rule that the adequacy of the consideration is for the 
parties rather than the courts, C.J.S. puts it this way: 
"Where the inadequacy (of consideration) is so 
gross as to shock the conscience and common sense 
of all men, it may amount both at law and in equity 
to proof of fraud, oppression, and undue influence. 
Where the inadequacy is such as to shock the moral 
sense, other circumstances such as fraud, mistake, 
misapprehension, surprise, irregularity, or anything 
else which conduces to the inadequacy of the price, 
will be readily seized to void the agreement." 
(Emphasis added) 17 C.J.S., Contracts 128, p. 846-7. 
POINT II 
RESCISSION BASED ON THE UNILATERAL 
MISTAKE WAS JUSTIFIED 
What is the testimony concerning the unilateral mistake? 
Lehmer at first did not know whether the home and lot was situated 
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A. It's a quit claim deed which Mr. Webster told 
me was the deed from his grantor to him and 
his wife. 
Q. When did you first receive that? 
A. I was first showed it when he asked me into his 
house after his wife's death to inquire into his 
rights in this mining property. I looked at it 
primarily to see that he had lived on the property 
for more than 20 years. 
(T. 223:2-8). 
Q. And with Bill and Mary Dudley? 
A* I knew their property was definitely on BLM land. 
Q. So they had a separate problem? 
A. Yes, and when I first talked with Floyd, I did 
not know if his land was on Bureau of Land 
Management lands or not. 
(T. 241:14-21). 
But later at the time of sale she had a definite belief. 
Q. (By Mr. Smedley) On October 7, 1980, you knew 
that the Webster house was on mining company 
property; did you not? 
A. I surely believed that, yes. 
(T. 250:18-21). 
Q. Did you have an opinion as of October 7th, 1980, 
as to whether or not Floyd Webster was a squatter? 
A. I have. 
Q. What was that opinion? 
A. That he was a squatter on mining property. 
(T. 268:17-21). 
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While Mrs. Lehmer's opinion gravitated towards the belief 
that the Webster home was on "mining" property, Floyd Webster 
arrived at the conclusion that he was on BLM land, and so believed 
at the time of the sale. He testified: 
Q. At the time you signed this document, who did you 
believe owned the property upon which your house 
is situated? 
A. Who owned the ground? 
Q. Yes. Who did you believe owned the ground? 
A. I believe the BLM did, the Bureau of Land 
Management. 
Q. Why did you believe that? 
(T. 117). 
He then goes on to explain why he so believed. (T. 117 to 120). 
Counsel for the defendants tried to impeach and belittle the basis 
for his belief by calling as their final witness a Stephen Schirf 
and by attempting to prevent that cross examination which would 
remove the mask and result in their gambit being played in vain. 
Notwithstanding Schirf reluctantly acknowledged the very truth of 
what he had been called upon to discredit. (T. 401:10-13). His 
testimony strengthened the integrity of plaintiff's position as 
did each of defendant's previous witnesses, Brown, Clegg, and 
Lehmer. 
Ironically part of the parcel was in fact on BLM land. 
(T. 235 and 405). 
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Floyd Webster was aware of the 50C a square policy. 
(T. 163) . He disclosed on the witness stand: 
Q. What difference does it make whether the land 
is owned by BLM or whether it was owned by the 
mining company or Royal Street? 
A. Well, the only difference I can see that BLM 
ground, you can't buy that. 
(T. 175). 
Q. (By Mr. Smedley) Mr. Webster, if on October 7th, 
1980, you had known that your property was on 
mining property or property owned by Royal Street 
Land Company other than BLM property, would you 
have sold it for $5,000? 
A. No. 
Q. Why not? 
A. I think that I could get more out of my property. 
It was valued more. 
(T. 133). 
Q. (By Mr. Smedley) With respect to the contract you 
signed on October 7th, 1980, do you feel that Mary 
was fair with you on that day? 
A. I figured she was, yes. 
Q. Do you feel that she is fair now? 
A. No. 
Q. Why not? 
A. Well, I figured that she knew that I was not on 
BLM ground. 
Q. If you were not on BLM property, did you expect 
Mary Lehmer to advise you that your land was not 
on BLM property? 
A. I would expect her to, yes. 
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Q. Why? 
A. Well, I trusted her. 
Q. Why did you trust her? 
A. For being a friend, a neighbor, I figured I 
trusted her. 
(T. 123) . 
Page 111 of the transcript may give some insight as to why 
he might have felt that his trust was plausible. 
Defendants rely heavily upon the precise wording from part 
of a sentence out of a Florida Case cited in Ashworth v. 
Charlesworth, 231 P.2d 724 (Utah 1951) and then sarcastically 
castigate the old gentleman for the things "he blithely assumed" 
and the things he failed for "more than 33 years" to do. Our 
response is simple. Although the "ordinary diligence" doctrine 
states a fundamental principle of equity jurisprudence this 
principle is not, in its application, so much an absolute rule to 
be followed by the courts as it is a guide for determining whether 
under the circumstances relief should be granted, for there is also 
an established maxim that equity will not suffer a wrong to be 
without a remedy, and this is probably the most important of the 
principles which are addressed to the court. But even this 
"most important" principle is not absolute and thus we must 
address the Ashworth v. Charlesworth argument* 
We believe that the "ordinary diligence" test can be honored 
by simply being sensitive to the circumstances. Perhaps the 
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language in Maryland Casualty Company v. Kransnek, 174 So 2d 541 
more accurately sets our the fundamental principle that was 
applied in the Ashworth case. The Florida court declared: 
"Equitable relief on the basis of unilateral 
mistake going to the substance of the agreement 
will be granted where the mistake did not result 
from an inexcusable lack of due care under the 
circumstances and the plaintiff's position has 
not been so changed in reliance on the contract 
that it would be unconscionable to order rescission." 
Assuming the above, then first of all there must be lack of 
due care and second this lack of due care must be inexcusable 
under the circumstances. 
Was Mr. Webster's failure to check out the ownership 
(BLM v. mining) "inexcusable lack of due care under the circumstances?" 
What were the circumstances? A 61 year old miner with an 
eighth grade education was called in off the street on the spur of 
the moment by his friends and neighbors; his friends and neighbors 
had him in their home court; he was there by invitation; they knew 
the purpose of the invitation, he did not; the friends and 
neighbors were people he trusted, one was an attorney that he had 
done things for "just. . . as a favor, as a friend;1' he was indigent 
and had a drinking problem; the water to his home had been turned 
off, so had the gas; he was unemployed; his hosts had discussed 
off and on their plan for acquiring his property; he had not given 
any thought to selling his home; for him there was the 
unavailability of independent advice; they had the benefit of 
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legal training and some 39 years of law practice, of advocacy 
and of training in the art of persuasion; they had bought and 
sold a number of homes, all arms length transactions; in all his 
life he had only purchased one home for the sum of $600,00 from 
his wife's parents. (Plaintiff's Statement of the Facts gives 
transcript page for each of the above facts). 
He did not ask them to purchase. He had not even thought 
about selling. Yet he is criticized for not anticipating and 
not having been prepared for the above unexpected execution of the 
"plan." Defendants seem to feel that the old minor should have 
been aware that every man is to fare in this world according to 
his management and everyone prospered according to his genius, 
his knowledge, his plans and schemes and training. 
It was the mosaic effect, the sum of the circumstances, 
including the gross disparity between the potential fair market 
value and the price contracted that caused the court to concludei 
"There existed a unilateral mistake of fact 
on the part of the plaintiff regarding ownership 
of the property sufficient to warrant rescission; 
indeed the consequences of which were so grave 
that to enforce this contract would be 
unconscionable. This unilateral mistake of fact 
specifically related to a material feature of 
the contract, that is the purchase price, in 
accordance with the doctrine set forth in the case 
of Ashworth v. Charlesworth, 119 UT 650 (1951) , 
and the plaintiff under the circumstances did not 
act negligently." (R. 498). 
0*7 
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The foregoing circumstances should be compared with the 
comments of Justice Latimer in the Ashworth v. Charlesworth case. 
The Supreme Court, Latimer, J., held that the evidence sustained 
the trial court's findings that the defendants bid had not been 
based upon a mistake, at least a mistake that would justify a 
rescission. The defendants were subcontractors doing business as 
painting contractors. They bid and tneir bid was accepted. In 
affirming the trial judge Justice Latimer's opinion contained the 
following observations concerning the circumstances: 
Plaintiffs invited. . . the defendant partnership, 
to submit bids on the painting of the bridge. The 
invitation to defendants was extended in September, 
1947. . . . At that time, Larsen told Charlesworth 
that plaintiffs had a contract to construct and 
paint the bridge at Green River and asked if 
defendants would be interested in submitting a bid. 
A few weeks later Charlesworth was in plaintiff's 
office in Salt Lake City and Larsen had the 
blueprints of the bridge on his desk. He told 
Charlesworth that they were the plans for the bridge 
which the parties had previously discussed. 
According to Larsenfs testimony Jack Charlesworth 
then examined the plans. . . . Toward the latter part 
of September, 1947, Larsen called Jack Charlesworth 
in Ogden and asked what his price would be for the 
painting of the bridge. Charlesworth said he would 
call Larsen back and give him a price. Charlesworth 
then discussed the matter with his father, called 
Larsen, and, over the telephone, gave a price of 
$500 for the work. On October 3, 1947, Jack 
Charlesworth caused a letter to be sent to plaintiffs 
in which he submitted a bid for the painting of the 
bridge. . .for the sum total of ?500. . . . After 
receipt of defendants1 telephonic bid, plaintiffs 
prepared a contract which was signed by Jack 
Charlesworth on October 15, 1947. . . . The 
• defendants were painting contractors of considerable 
experience; they knew that plans and specifications 
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had been prepared for the particular job; they 
were able to read and interpret such plans; and 
no reasonable excuse appears to justify their 
failure to see and know what was clearly exhibited 
by the drawings and specifications. In the early 
part of the preliminary negotiations detailed plans 
were submitted to them and the trial court found 
that Jack Charlesworth saw and had an opportunity 
to make a careful examination of them. . . . After 
making an inspection of the plans and specifications/ 
defendants were not rushed into submitting a bid. 
On the contrary, they were given ample time in which 
to carefully consider their contract price and to 
make any further inquiry or investigation desired 
by them. Several days expired between the time Jack 
Charlesworth looked over the plans and the time he 
was contacted over the telephone. Thereafter, the 
amount of the bid was discussed between the two 
defendants before they submitted their written offer 
to the plaintiffs. This offer was followed by the 
preparation of a formal written contract, which was 
submitted to the defendants for consideration. . . . 
But, in view of all the facts and circumstances/ we 
cannot hold that the trial judge abused his discretion 
in denying defendants relief because of the claimed 
failure to disclose. Plaintiffs believed they were 
dealing with contractors who were competent to 
estimate painting costs. They had not previously 
contracted for the painting of bridges and were 
unfamiliar with the manner or method of estimating 
the costs of that type of work. Plaintiffs knew 
that defendants had ample opportunity to examine the 
plans and specifications. (119 Utah 653/ 657/ 658, 
659/ 660) . 
Citing Ashworth v. Charlesworth as "the controlling case law" 
appellants quote only a portion of only one sentence to support 
their position. They interestingly leave out the qualifying words 
and it is also interesting that their quote comes not from the 
language of Justice Latimer but is selected from a portion of a 
single sentence of a cited Florida case. Justice Latimer 
7Q 
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emphasized portions of said authorities. The portions he 
emphasized includes such qualifying phrases as "generally" and 
"where there is no. . . inequitable conduct." Ashworth v. 
Charlesworth, 119 UT 650, 656 and 657. A complete reading of 
the Ashworth case would convince even the casual reader that the 
case could be used to support the trial judge in his decision in 
favor of Webster and against the defendants Lehraers. 
Should not a court of equity consider how the old miner was 
suddenly drawn into the act and how he was not advised by Attorney 
Lehmer to consult with a disinterested friend or counsel? We find 
the following language in Am Jur: 
In general, it may be said that wherever 
advantage is taken of a party under 
circumstances which mislead, confuse, or 
disturb the just result of his judgment, and 
thus expose him to be the victim of the artful, 
the importunate, and the cunning, where proper 
time is not allowed to the party and he acts 
improvidently, or if he is importunately 
pressed, if those in whom he places confidence 
make use of strong persuasions, if he is not 
fully aware of the consequences, but is suddenly 
drawn in to act, if he is not permitted to consult 
disinterested friends or counsel before he is 
called on to act in circumstances of sudden 
emergency or unexpected right or acquisition in 
these and many similar cases, if there has been 
great inequality in the bargain, courts of equity 
will assist the party on the ground of fraud, 
imposition, or unconscionable advantage. 
27 Am Jur 2d, Equity, p. 549, sec 24. 
If the court concluded based on all the evidence and the 
demeanor of the witnesses that defendants knew of or suspicioned 
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plaintiff's mistake, then was not rescission properly granted 
irrespective of any possible lack of due care. Williston on 
C (3rd Ed) puts it this way (Section 1557, page 243): 
"Knowledge by one party to a bargain that the 
other is under a mistake as to such a matter as 
would make the transaction voidable if the 
mistake were mutual, if accompanied by any 
circumstances deemed inequitable. . . will have 
the same effect as mutual mistake in justifying 
rescission." 
We might also want to consider the language of Cardozo on 
this issue of neglect or mistake. 
"True, indeed, it is that accident and mistake 
will often be inadequate to supply a basis for 
the granting or withholding of equitable remedies 
where the consequences to be corrected might have 
been avoided if the victim of the misfortune had 
ordered his affairs with reasonable diligence. 
United States v. Ames, 99 U.S. 35, 47, 25 L.Ed. 
295; Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U.S. 55, 23 L.Ed. 798; 
Noyes v. Clark, 7 Paige, N.Y., 179 (32 Am.Dec. 620). 
The restriction, however, is not obdurate, for 
always the gravity of the fault must be compared 
with the gravity of the hardship. Noyes v. 
Anderson, 124 N.Y. 175 (26 N.E. 316, 21 Am. St. 
Rep. 657); Lawrence v. American National Bank, 
54 N.Y. 432; Ball v. Shepard, 202 N.Y. 247, 253, 
95 N.E. 719. Let the harship be strong enough, 
and equity will find a way, though many a formula 
of inaction may seen to bar the path. Griswold 
v. Hazard, 141 U.S. 260, 284, 11 S.Ct. 972, 999, 
35 L.Ed. 678." Cardozo, C. J., dissenting in Graf 
v. Hope Building Corp., 254 N.Y. 1, 171 N.E. 884, 
888, 70 A.L.R. 984. 
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POINT III 
RESCISSION BASED ON MUTUAL MISTAKE AS TO 
ONE'S INTEREST IN LAND 
Was the non-existence of a "joint tenancy" a mistake of 
fact or a mistake of law? Or perhaps both exist. Assuming that 
it is a mistake of law only, then defendant might argue that 
equity does not relieve against mistakes of law. But this rule 
has been frankly or actually modified in a good many cases when 
dealing with mistake as to one's interest in land. Those cases 
which grant relief may be classified as follows: (1) those that 
frankly grant relief in cases of mistake of law; (2) those which 
grant relief because there is also present undue influence, fraud, 
or other ground of equitable cognizance; (3) those cases which 
call the mistake a mistake of fact, or say that it is analogous 
to a mistake of fact. 
In an interesting case, Greer v. Higgins, Mississippi, 338 
Southern Reporter, 2d 1233, we are confronted with a widow and 
second wife of a decedent, together with her children, who brought 
an action against the decedent's first wife and her children, 
seeking to have a deed to defendants cancelled on the ground that 
it had been executed under the misapprehension that the decedent 
had died intestate. The supreme Court of Mississippi held that 
the doctrine of mutual mistake of fact was applicable and that the 
deed therefore should be set aside. 
17 
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The court reasoned as follows; 
In 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 144, at 894, it is said: 
"A mutual mistake (of facts) is one common to both 
parties to a contract, each laboring under the same 
misconception; more precisely, it is one common to 
both or all parties, wherein each labors under the 
same misconception respecting a material fact, the 
terms of the agreement, or the provisions of the 
written instrument designed to embody such agreement. 
The mistake may apply to the nature of the contract, 
the identity of the person with whom it is made, or 
the identity or existence of the subject matter; but 
in order to -relieve a party from liability on the 
contract, the mistake must relate to a material fact, 
past or present. Misrepresentation or fraud is not 
essential to proof of a mutual mistake." 
There can be no doubt that when the parties executed 
the deeds to each other in September 1970 they were 
all laboring under the mistaken belief that Mr. Greer 
had departed this life intestate. There can be no 
> doubt that the mistake was mutual and there can be no 
doubt that the mistake was material. The deeds would 
not have been executed but for the mistaken belief as 
to the non-existence of the will. 
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the facts of 
this case present a clear case for the application of 
the doctrine of mutual mistake of fact and that, 
accordingly, the deed executed by the appellants and 
their mother to the appellees should be cancelled and 
set aside. Greer v. Higgins, 338 S.2d 1233, 1236. 
13 Williston on Contracts, 3d ed, Section 1589, makes it clear 
that ". . .if parties contract under a mutual mistake and 
misapprehension as to their relative and respective rights, the 
result is, that the agreement is liable to be set aside as having 
proceeded upon a common mistake." p 568. (Emphasis added). It 
then states: "Mistake as to title to land is relieved against." 
p 569. 
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One reason that rescission is appropriate is because this 
was not a simple mistake as to the ownership of a one-third 
interest in the land, but had to do with the existence of a 
special relationship between the co-owners. If it had been simply 
a matter of deficiency in acreage, then an abatement (an adjustment 
of the purchase price) might have been the remedy which would best 
do justice. However, in this case it would have required the court 
to create a common ownership in the old family home between Lehmers 
and the children of the plaintiff who felt their father had been 
taken advantage of. That type of hostile marriage was never 
contemplated by either plaintiff or the defendant. The "joint 
tenancy" mistake itself was so important that it determined the 
conduct of the mistaken parties. 
Another reason that the mutual mistake justifies rescission 
is because defendants, Lehmers, stipulated and acknowledged that 
the severance of the joint tenancy was a condition precedent to 
Webster receiving the purchase price of ?5000.00. 
A. (Mary Lehmer) I told him that he would have 
to do that for himself a few years earlier 
when we discussed when I had no intention of 
buying his property. 
Q. Why would he have to do it, Mrs. Lehmer? 
A. I wouldn't have given him the money unless I 
had him sign that thing and produce a death 
certificate before I gave him the $5,000. 
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Q. So you would not have given him the $5,000 
as payment for the purchase of the house as 
contained in the October 7th, 1980, agreement 
unless he had severed the joint tenancy on 
the property, is that correct? 
MR. CAMPBELL: I stipulate to that, Your Honor. 
She's already answered the question. That 
repetitious. 
MR. SMEDLEY: I'm asking for an answer from the 
witness. 
THE COURT: Well, overruled. 
Q. (By Mr. Smedley) Would you answer the question. 
A. I would have had that done or I would not have 
given him the money. That's why I did it on 
December 21st to get things in readiness. 
(T. 264). 
This is a court of equity and thus we are to look to the 
substance rather than the form. It seems clear that the substance 
of what was intended before Lehmers would pay, was to effect the 
passing of Alice Webster's interest to Floyd Webster. 
Mr. Campbell stipulated that "unless he (Floyd Webster) had 
severed the joint tenancy" the Lehmers "would not have given him 
the $5,000 as payment." Mary Lehmer confirmed this when she stated, 
"I would have had that done or I would not have given him the 
money." 
Floyd Webster did not have the ability to perform the substance 
of what was intended. Going through the form of severing a non-
existing joint tenancy would not have produced the results 
contemplated. The only advantage would have been to mislead the 
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county recorder or those examining the record title or potential 
purchasers into believing that the deceased wife's interest had 
passed to the plaintiff and the children had no claim. 
There was not only mutual mistake, but also present ground of 
equitable cognizance. "The principle of mutuality of right should 
apply, that is, the rights of the plaintiff and the defendants 
should be reciprocal." (Conclusion of Law #6). 
POINT IV 
THE FIDUCIARY OR CONFIDENTIAL OR DOMINANT-SERVIENT 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHEREBY PLAINTIFF 
MANIFESTED DEPENDENCE AND TRUST IN DEFENDANTS AND 
ENTERED INTO THE SUBJECT AGREEMENTS AS A RESULT THEREOF. 
Floyd Webster at 61 with an eighth grade education had been 
an underground miner for 30 years. In the fall of 1980 he was 
unemployed and without funds and had a drinking problem. These 
things defendants knew. Floyd Webster did work for the Lehmers 
without charge and met with them as friends. He knew that Mary 
Lehmer was very knowledgeable regarding the title problem with the 
mining company and she had advised both him and his wife in her 
capacity as an attorney. Floyd Webster believed that they would 
not act contrary to his interests, and he trusted them. He believed 
the house was on Bureau Land Management ground and he sold property 
worth $240,000.00 to $400,000.00 for $5,000.00. The Lehmers knew 
the property was on mining company land. 
If these things were shown by clear and convicing evidence, 
then plaintiff established an additional cause for rescission. 
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13 Williston on Contracts (3rd Edition) sec. 1625, p. 776, puts 
it this way: 
If a party in whom another reposes confidence 
misuses that confidence to gain his own 
advantage while the other has been made to feel 
that the party in question will not act against 
his welfare, the transaction is the result of 
undue influence. 
The confidence moving from one party places the 
other party in a position of dominance and 
influence analogous to a confidential or fiduciary 
relationship. It is not the existence of this 
relationship which is undue but its misuse. 
There is a technical difference between a 
fiduciary relationship and a confidential 
relationship, but most courts ignore it because 
in practical effect the result is much the same 
in either case. . . . 
Where the party alleging undue influence has made 
a case for the existence of a putative fiduciary 
or confidential relationship, any gain realized 
by the dominant party will be presumed to have 
been the result of abuse of the relationship and 
prima facie voidable. It is then up to the 
dominant party to rebut this presumption by 
showing the servient party had full knowledge 
of all the circumstances, independent advice or 
an opportunity to obtain it, and that the 
transaction was fair and not the result of undue 
influence. 
A vital part of this proof is that the party 
claiming to be the victim of undue influence had 
independent advice or an opportunity to obtain 
such advice. Proper independent advice means 
that the alleged victim had the benefit of a full 
and private conference with someone who could give 
competent advice and was disassociated from any 
gain or loss by the transaction. 
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"Additional circumstances involved in any 
determination of undue influence include age, 
mental condition, physical infirmities, and the 
consideration exchanged for the benefit received. 
These are all elements which will be considered 
by the courts when making a determination as to 
the existence of undue influence." 
Section 1626, p. 800, 
"The various circumstances of age, infirmity, 
or weak-mindedness of the promisor, or inadequacy 
of consideration will not usually be sufficient 
for proof of undue influence - these are merely 
elements of the proof. 
"The party alleging undue influence can, however, 
avoid this direct burden of proof by simply proving 
that he was the servient member of a confidential 
or fiduciary relationship. Courts hold that this 
raises a rebuttable presumption of undue influence 
requiring the dominant party to come forward with 
proof of the fairness of the transaction. 
"This doctrine has been held applicable to a wide 
variety of confidential and fiduciary relationships, 
it is in fact applicable to any situation where, in 
fact, influence was acquired or confidence reposed, 
whether the basis for the reposing of this confidence 
is moral, social, domestic or merely personal." 
The American Law Institute Restatement of Law, 2d, Contracts 
2d, Section 208 reads: 
If a contract or a term thereof is unconscionable 
at the time the contract is made, a court may 
refuse to enforce the contract. . . . 
Two pertinent comments under this section appeared to be 
applicable to this case. 
c. Overall Imbalance. Inadequacy of 
consideration does not of itself invalidate a 
bargain, but gross disparity in the values 
exchanged may be an important factor in a 
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determination that a contract is unconscionable 
and may be sufficient ground, without more, 
for denying specific performances. See Sections 
79,364. Such a disparity may also corroborate 
indications of defects in the bargaining process, 
or may affect the remedy to be granted when there 
is a violation of a more specific rule. 
Theoretically it is possible for a contract to 
be oppressive taken as a whole, even though there 
is no weakness in the bargaining process and no 
single term which is in itself unconscionable. 
Ordinarily, however, an unconscionable contract 
involves other factors as well as overall 
imbalance. 
d. Weakness in the Bargaining Process. A 
bargain is not unconscionable merely because 
the parties to it are unequal in bargaining 
position, nor even because the inequality 
results in an allocation of risks to the weaker 
party. But gross inequality of bargaining power, 
together with terms unreasonably favorable to 
the stronger party, may confirm indications that 
the transaction involved elements of deception 
or compulsion, or may show that the weaker party 
had no meaningful choice, no real alternative, or 
did not in fact assent or appear to assent to 
the unfair terms. Factors which may contribute 
to a finding of unconscionability in the 
bargaining process include the following: 
belief by the stronger party that there is 
reasonable probability that the weaker party 
will fully perform the contract; knowledge of 
the stronger party that the weaker party will 
be unable to receive substantial benefits 
from the contract; knowledge of the stronger 
party that the weaker party is unable reasonably 
to protect his interests by reason of physical 
or mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy or 
inability to understand the language of the 
agreement, or similar factors. 
08 is supported by Section 364. Effect of Unfairness: 
Specific performance or an injunction will be 
refused if such relief would be unfair because 
7Q 
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(a) the contract was induced by mistake or by 
unfair practices; 
(b) the relief would cause unreasonable hardship 
or loss to the party in breach or to third 
persons, or 
(c) the exchange is grossly inadequate or the 
terms of the contract are otherwise unfair. 
In citing Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, (a voluntary conveyance 
to a son), and Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah 2d 378, (a transfer 
to a niece reared as a daughter), appellants cite cases where 
"the testimony. . . and conduct completely negative the possibility 
of a mistake" (16 Utah 2d 385) and where the transfers were not 
inequitable and there were not present grounds of equitable 
cognizance. Appellants also omit such qualify language as, 
The doctrine of confidential relationship rests 
upon the principle of inequality between the 
parties, and implies a position of superiority 
occupied by one of the parties over the other. 
Mere confidence in one person by another is not 
sufficient alone to constitute such a relationship. 
The confidence must be reposed by one under such 
circumstances as to create a corresponding duty, 
either legal or moral, upon the part of the other 
to observe the confidence, and it must result in 
a situation where as a matter of fact there is 
superior influence on one side and dependence on the 
other. Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah 2d 378, 383, 
and 
No general or hard and fast rule which shall govern 
or control in all cases can be promulgated, but every 
case must, to a very large extent, be determined 
upon the facts and circumstances present in that 
case. All that we can say, therefore, is that in this 
case the findings and conclusions of the trial court 
in refusing to set aside the deeds in question 
upon the ground of undue influence and want of mental 
capacity are not only clearly sustained by the 
evidence, but in our judgment, the findings and 
judgment are in accord with the greater weight of 
the evidence. Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 231. 
An 
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Constructive Fraud, No part of the jurisdiction of the 
court is more useful than that which it exercises in watching 
and controlling transactions between parties standing in a 
relationship of confidence to each other. A party in a 
"semiconfidential" relationship who gains an advantage, Mby 
superior knowledge and artful silence," whereby he drives an 
exhorbitant and unconscionable bargain is guilty of constructive 
fraud against which relief in equity will be granted. Gierth v. 
Fidelity Trust Company, 93 NJ Eq 163, 115 A 397, 18 ALR 976. 
Constructive fraud, sometimes called fraud in law, or implied fraud 
rests less upon furtive intent than actual fraud, it need not 
involve dishonesty or the element of deceit. Am Jur statess 
A mistake relievable in equity is said to be 
some unintentional act, omission or error, 
arising from ignorance, surprise, imposition, 
or misplaced confidence. Equity undoubtedly 
has jurisdiction to grant relief against a 
mistake amounting to constructive fraud. 
Accordingly, equity may and should always 
intervene to prevent unjust enrichment. . . by 
virtue of a mistake. 27 Am Jur 2d p. 552, 
Equity 28. 
i 
The evidence was clear and convincing as to an "overall 
imbalance." The sum total of the circumstances clearly 
corroborated plaintiff's claim that rescission was a proper remedy 
i 
and a remedy which would best do justice. 
The evidence was clear and convincing that there was a 
unilateral mistake as regarding record fee ownership - plaintiff 
i 
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believing on October 7, 1980, that his property was claimed by 
the Bureau of Land Management; defendant knowing that the fee 
ownership was reflected in private ownership and thus subject 
to any valid adverse possession claims of plaintiff and to any 
applicable statute of limitations. 
The evidence disclosed beyond a reasonable doubt that both 
parties believed the property was held in joint tenancy, when, 
in fact, it was held in tenants in common with an interest in the 
plaintiffTs daughters. 
Because of plaintiff's condition and his circumstances, 
because he was called in off the street with no advance notice or 
independent advice, because the proposal was that of the 
defendants by previous "plan", and because the writing was 
immediately drafted by defendant, Mary Lehmer, a skilled legal 
advisor and friend and neighbor, and thereupon signed by plaintiff 
without having had an opportunity to contemplate, seek independent 
advice, and/or search out ownership, the court was persuaded by 
clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff was not guilty of 
negligence in not being aware of record fee ownership and that 
his unawareness was not the result of inexcusable lack of due care 
and that rescission was proper. 
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POINT V 
APPELLATE COURT TO GIVE CONSIDERABLE 
DEFERENCE TO FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT 
OF TRIAL COURT 
Even in a proceedings in equity, "it is, . . well established 
that because of the advantaged position of the trial court" the 
appellate court will "give considerable deference to his findings 
and judgment." Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976). 
CONCLUSION 
It is axiomatic that in the realm of equity, no formula is 
absolute and no rule is without exception. Defendants ignore this 
axiom and attempt to dissect and to establish absolutes from 
isolated particulars. Very simply, the court found that because 
of the "sum of the circumstances" that the plaintiff was entitled 
to relief. The salient points were (1) plaintiff (under a unique 
set of circumstances) was called in off the street on the spur of 
the moment into the home of his neighbors and friends without 
advance warning, (2) the gross disparity between the potential 
fair market value at the time of the transaction to the plaintiff 
and his daughters and the price paid, (3) both parties were acting 
upon a mutual mistake of substantial proportions, and (4) the 
< 
existence of a unilateral mistake which was critical. The 
supporting evidence to these matters was not only clear and 
convincing but almost unchallenged. 
i 
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Plaintiff's right to equitable relief rests upon the peculiar 
facts and circumstances. The ultimate issue. . . Which remedy 
would best do justice? The trial court appropriately determined 
that rescission was a proper remedy, i.e. , returning the parties 
to the positions they occupied before entering into the contract. 
Dated this ^^jLday of April, 1984. 
Respectfully submitted, 
>f<^&? 
JM1ES J . SMEDfEY 
3 o \ j o r t h Main, S u i t e 
Heber C i t y , Utah 840/32 
At torney for Respondent 
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